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C’  arises in relation to one of the most troubling 
suggestions in the fi ction of his later career. Already in Disgrace (), 
but still more starkly and disturbingly in Elizabeth Costello (), the 
modern human community associates itself with a normalization of atroc-
ity; indeed, atrocity seems to situate itself at the very core of the modern. 
Coetzee’s writing registers and then counters this atrocious modernity 
by opening and extending the ethical bounds of human community, by 
envisioning animals as fellow beings deserving the consideration and 
protection that more typically are accorded only to the human being. 
 is extension of entitlement, however, necessarily impugns the typical 
economy of modern human collectives. As novelist Elizabeth Costello 
observes to a gathering of academics, her tour of their American college 
town has included “no horrors, no drug-testing laboratories, no factory 
farms, no abattoirs. Yet I am sure they are here.…  ey are all around us 
as I speak” (Coetzee, Elizabeth ). In denouncing these unacknowledged 
but omnipresent horrors, Elizabeth voices a deep questioning of how we 
moderns understand ourselves and our relationships with other living 
beings.
The Community of Sentient Beings: 




ESC .– (March/June ): –
 | Randall
To expand the sphere of our community beyond the bounds of the 
human, Coetzee must adopt a broader sense of the interactions and inter-
dependencies that impact upon and give shape to human lives; he must 
also expand his delineation of the sphere of human responsibility. Ecologi-
cal understanding and imagination are required. Ecology, the “study of 
relationships, energy transfers, mutualities, connections and cause-and-
eff ect networks within natural systems” (Snyder ), does not dispense 
with social and political sciences, though it does contextualize them and 
qualifi es their claims to status as autonomous realms of knowledge and 
enquiry. Coetzee’s imagination, as represented in the later development 
of Disgrace and throughout Elizabeth Costello, works to discern the 
relationships human beings establish with the non-human world and to 
understand and evaluate humanity in terms of these relationships. Animal 
being—the living presence of the animal, in our world and in ourselves—is 
a concern that haunts the writing, at times asserting itself as a focal topic, 
at times abiding as a shadowy but inescapable presence. Intensifi ed focus 
on the animal enables Coetzee to write in a zone of intersection between 
sociopolitical and ecological concerns, to elaborate an ecologically ori-
ented ethics that sharpens the critique of modern political regimes that 
dominate and exploit fellow beings both human and non-human. By con-
joining attention to animal being with analysis of the more conventionally 
defi ned social and political zones of human experience, Coetzee eff ectively 
denounces, as Graham Huggan suggests, “the dominance of instrumental 
reason as a means of justifying authoritarian behavior … both within and 
beyond the (human) species” (). Coetzee also tacitly acknowledges that 
modern animal fables have been used, even quite recently, “to prop up the 
social hierarchies and disciplinary regimes that legitimize imperial rule” 
(Huggan ). His new kind of animal-inhabited fi ction recognizes that 
the animal is a primordial presence in the structuring of human politics 
and, more crucially, that animality marks the point of our most intense 
participation in an expansive, much-more-than-human world of living 
beings.  e relationships we establish with animals, imaginatively and 
materially, manifest the degree to which we have understood, or failed to 
understand, our participation and the responsibilities this participation 
entails. When such understanding fails most entirely, what ensues is atroc-
ity—the distressingly insistent element of the Coetzee text.
Like David Lurie of Disgrace, Elizabeth Costello recognizes atrocious 
aspects of some human-to-human relations as well as being aware of the 
atrocious treatment of animals by humans. Her preoccupation with the 
borders of the human, however, is more searching than David’s, and she 
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deliberately chooses to open these borders by making sentience rather 
than reason the criterion for inclusion in community. Sentient being 
emerges as the criterion of value determining the human being’s rela-
tions of responsibility with other humans and with animals.  is choice 
of sentience over reason has to do with reason’s historical failures: “reason” 
has been used to legitimate the abuse of animals and of human groups.  e 
full and dignifying claim to reason has been denied not only to animals 
but also occasionally to human groups—to women, to non-European 
peoples—and this has been accompanied by denial of full status within 
the human community, and by consequent abuses.  is naming of the 
new community-determining trait as sentience co-ordinates with Derek 
Attridge’s important recognition that a late-modern global “great ratio-
nalization” is a focal concern in Coetzee’s portrayal of troubled times in 
his later fi ctions (“Age” –). One should also note, following Barney, 
Coetzee’s clear awareness, throughout his literary career, that rationality 
has ever been a key measure in the discourse of European imperialism, 
one that has been deployed in conjunction with “the category of animal 
life” to specify the defi ciencies of non-European peoples with respect to 
the ostensibly ideal humanity encoded by modern, Western civility (). 
 e particular understanding of the relationship between the animal 
and the human that one fi nds in Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello has a quite 
broad range of antecedents in the modern history of ideas. Continental 
thinking of the last half century has taken up as a more than incidental 
topic the ethical implications of human relationships with the animal 
world.  eodor Adorno has asserted that animals should be, in them-
selves, objects of ethical consideration and has traced his own thinking 
back to Schopenhauer, who had much earlier taken up a like position and 
opposed it to an earlier established and more prevalent Kantian position. 
Emmanuel Levinas also has taken the measure of the animal as a possible 
manifestation of the ineluctable other, “le prochain,” upon which Levina-
sian ethics is founded. Giorgio Agamben, more recently, has addressed 
the question of animal being, most notably in response to Levinas. Among 
Jacques Derrida’s posthumous publications is his volume on the place of 
animals in human thought and experience, which notes a deeply encoded 
disavowal of the animal, particularly in philosophical traditions, but also 
the unignorable prominence of the animal in literary, poetic writing.¹
 See Adorno Negative Dialectics, Levinas “ e Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” 
Agamben  e Open: Man and Animal, and Derrida  e Animal  at  erefore 
I Am.
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Coetzee’s vision, however, most clearly reveals its affi  nities with a mod-
ern line of Anglophone-world utilitarian ethics, for which Peter Singer 
provides the most prominent contemporary voice. His landmark book, 
Animal Liberation, dates from  (and consolidates still earlier short 
publications), but Singer has remained true to his original thinking in his 
subsequent and still enduring career. He enjoys the support of various 
like-minded (if at times debative) contemporaries, of whom Tom Regan is 
perhaps the most noteworthy, and his arguments trace back through the 
contributions of immediate predecessors such as R. M. Hare to an origin 
frankly located in Bentham. For Singer, modern human collectives have 
shown themselves quite universally guilty of “speciesism,” a cast of mind 
he directly associates with more prominently contested discriminatory 
orientations: racism and sexism (see “All Animals”).  e speciesist, like 
the sexist or the racist, unjustifi ably confi nes his or her sense of ethical 
responsibility within the scope of a self-defi ning, self-affi  rming group 
identifi cation. Singer’s countering ethics presents as its core imperative an 
“equality of consideration of interests” that extends to all sentient beings, 
to all beings capable of suff ering and of enjoyment of life (Practical ff .; 
“All Animals” ).
Questions of animal being and animal rights fi gure prominently in the 
fl ood of critical response that has followed the publication of Disgrace, 
which has become in a short time, despite its position in the author’s later 
career, Coetzee’s most discussed book.  is bringing into focus of the 
animal topic is partly due to, and also justifi ed by, the publication, also in 
, of the lectures titled  e Lives of Animals, material that was subse-
quently incorporated in Elizabeth Costello. (Singer, noteworthily, is one 
of the several respondents published in  e Lives of Animals.) Even the 
critical texts on Disgrace that do not off er signifi cant address to the animal 
topic manifest a sense that one needs, at least, to make mention of it.  e 
spectrum of views is perhaps best suggested by its extremes: Tom Herron 
affi  rms that Disgrace is crucially about animals, that “animals become the 
novel’s matter; they become what matters” (); Gayatri Spivak, focusing 
strongly on the fi gure of Lucy Lurie, argues that her father David’s eventual 
intense concern with animal lives is an instance of misprision, arising out 
of his general failure to understand his daughter. Herron’s position seems 
slightly dubious, although it is strongly argued and enlightening in many of 
its aspects. But unless the far from unprecedented affi  rmation we-too-are-
animals has become Coetzee’s main point, rather than a preliminary point 
or premise, it would be curious indeed to fi nd that his intensifi ed attention 
to animals and animal being actually refl ected the animal’s ascent to the 
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status of an absolutely per se organizing concern. Yet, Spivak’s sense of the 
place of animals in Coetzee’s text seems still less accurate. Her particular 
understanding of Lucy Lurie’s narrative function—as the site of narrative 
“counterfocalization” ()—is crucial for the novel’s best interpretation, 
but it hardly requires Spivak’s contingent dismissal of the novel’s animal-
focused passages. Coetzee’s publication of  e Lives of Animals, and a 
little later Elizabeth Costello, clearly suggests that Spivak has accorded 
too little esteem to Coetzee’s animals (as represented in Disgrace). Indeed, 
the choice of a woman as the principal character of the  novel and 
the earlier Lives would seem to confi rm that gender and animality are, in 
Coetzee’s new line of thought and imagination, linked rather than distinct 
concerns.
 e existing criticism, however, has well and thoroughly argued a few 
key points. Josephine Donovan, and still more comprehensively Louis 
Tremaine, have asserted and evidenced the general importance of animals 
in Coetzee’s fi ctional career from its very beginnings. However, these con-
tributions give more attention to Disgrace than to Elizabeth Costello and, 
therefore, see in both works a sharpening of focus on the animal question 
rather than a new enunciation of the relationship between human and 
animal being. More crucially, several critics have noted that animals have 
become part of, and in fact central to, the elaboration of Coetzee’s ethical 
vision. David Atwell, while engaged in the analysis of Coetzee’s treatment 
of race, observes that ethical consciousness in Coetzee turns its focus from 
history’s disheartening facts to “the conditions which humanity shares 
with all the earth’s creatures: the fact of biological existence” (). Elleke 
Boehmer, although like Spivak in giving her most focused attention to the 
topic of gender, asserts that Coetzee, in Disgrace and in subsequent works, 
“proposes animals as the essential third term in the reconciliation of human 
self and human other” (). Tom Herron fi nds in Coetzee’s animals the 
principal fi gures of the other—the other whose full recognition is the 
source and foundation of ethical awareness. Mike Marais acknowledges 
that the ethical importance of sympathetic imagination manifests itself in 
Disgrace partly in relation to animals, and in this respect the  novel 
looks forward to the more strongly stated ethically-charged link between 
animals and sympathetic imagination in Elizabeth Costello.  e various 
analyses of Coetzee’s ethical content share a sense that Coetzee, to arrive 
at an eff ective articulation of values, must accord value to the animal.
 e new orientations in Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello follow from 
those of the earlier fi ctions but also show, through retrospective exami-
nation and comparison, how the later work makes distinct use of earlier 
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established topics. Taking the example of Waiting for the Barbarians, 
published in , one can see that Coetzee was already concerned with 
atrocious violations of the codes of common humanity.  e Magistrate 
at the centre of this early work suff ers confi nement, humiliation, and ulti-
mately torture. He accounts for his experience using animal analogies, 
which are deployed in close relation with a documenting of dehuman-
izing bodily experience.  us, even quite early in his imprisonment he 
refl ects, “I guzzle my food like a dog. A bestial life is turning me into a 
beast” (). Later, his reduction to merely animal subsistence is equated 
with an exclusively carnal sense of self: like Pavlov’s dogs, he begins to 
salivate uncontrollably upon the presentation of food, and he comes to 
know “the misery of being simply a body that feels itself sick and wants 
to be well” (). Still later, he recounts his submission to torture, saying 
that his tormentors aim to demonstrate “what it mean[s] to live in a body, 
as a body”, and thus to show him “the meaning of humanity” (). In this 
narrative, what diff ers signifi cantly from the orientations of the later fi c-
tions is the unshaken belief that one arrives at animal existence through a 
process of violent reduction; one is reduced to a life that is no more than 
bodily life.  e novel measures the value of humanity and human life in 
relation to mere animal life, mere bodily life.  is state of being is the 
ground zero that remains after human complexity has been destroyed. In 
the later works, the human being’s animal life or bodily life is presented 
as a main site—even as the main site—of human complexity; it manifests 
itself as a foundation on which to build a sense of the human that is more 
expansive and more inclusive.
 e early pages of Disgrace are signifi cantly marked by animal analo-
gies that are only seemingly casual. As is commonly the case in literary 
works, and indeed in everyday speech, animals provide touchstones for 
the delineation of human experience.  us, David Lurie very promptly 
announces that the “totem” of his sexual character is “the snake” (). 
 is early, pseudo-anthropological mention of the totem immediately 
reminds us of how deep the animal analogy goes in human self-concep-
tion. Such animal inscriptions have been amply documented by critics and 
established as essential elements in Coetzee’s texts. Disgrace, in its early 
development, does not press beyond earlier works with respect to the 
ethical and political considerations of the relationship between animality 
and humanity.  e early use of animal fi gures serves only to prepare the 
ground for later, more searching refl ections, which fi rst arise in debate 
with Lucy, in the period after her father’s academic disgrace. Although 
not so intensely animal-focused as the other key woman character Bev 
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Shaw, Lucy distinguishes herself by articulating her thoughts and feel-
ings about animals in ethical and political terms. ( ese are signifi cant 
aspects of Lucy’s complex agency within the novel, which Spivak, in her 
counter-focalization of the character, fails to note with due emphasis.) 
Lucy observes that animals, dogs among others, have no place in “the 
list of the nation’s priorities,” thus implying that they should have a place, 
though they do not. More crucially, Lucy asserts, again in debate with 
her father, “there is no higher life.  is is the only life there is. Which we 
share with animals” (). Signifi cantly, David tries to counter his daughter’s 
assertion of shared life by taking up a rather tired but readily recogniz-
able stance: “We are of a diff erent order of creation from the animals. Not 
higher, necessarily, just diff erent” (). In a diff erent national context, this 
response might be merely knee-jerkish, intellectually lazy, but David and 
Lucy are in South Africa, where not-higher-just-diff erent has been the 
gentler statement of Apartheid logic—specifi cally, the argument and policy 
of “separate development.” In other words, in South Africa (and indeed 
elsewhere) David Lurie’s logic has been used, in oppressive, violating ways, 
against human beings.
In its early enunciations, David’s insuffi  ciently thoughtful attitude 
toward animals is typically compromised by darkly suggested analogies 
with his disposition toward other human beings. So, for instance, Bev 
Shaw, the book’s most deeply committed animal lover, hopefully queries 
the former professor about his aff ection for animals. He responds that he 
undoubtedly does “like animals” because he eats them; he at least likes 
“some parts” of them (). David’s attitude to women seems notably similar, 
as is evidenced by his occasional trivializing and unoriginal “animalization” 
of Soraya, and more particularly by his subsequent responses to Melanie. 
David fetishises Melanie’s body to a very notable degree, dwelling upon 
her girlishly slim hips, her perky breasts; one may say that he evidently 
likes her, or at least some parts of her.
David’s sardonic irony is typical of his early responses to questions 
about his attitude to animals, and also to other human beings. Irony, the 
predominant disposition of modernist thought and imagination, is an 
appreciably complex, sophisticated disposition of the thinking being, the 
rational mind. Yet dispassionate irony, of the sort David Lurie repeatedly 
manifests, seems in Coetzee’s view to be decidedly inadequate to the ethi-
cal and political considerations due to late-modern realities, particularly 
as these are manifested in late-twentieth-century South Africa. Such irony 
is left behind once David comes to understand animals as fellow beings, 
and one should note that Elizabeth Costello is devoid of irony in all her 
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refl ections upon eco-ethical and eco-political issues. Indeed, she insists 
that her comparison of herself with Kafka’s ape is not “ironically” intended: 
“It means what it says. I say what I mean” ().  is rejection of irony is 
also a refusal to evoke the animal as a fi gural, allegorical representation 
of human traits or types—the typical literary and pedagogical use of the 
animal, which David very much goes in for in the early sections of Disgrace. 
Elizabeth steadfastly refuses to be sophisticated about animals. She strives 
repeatedly to discover and enunciate an integrated, unifying perspective 
upon sentient being, without ironic dualities or oppositions, without 
adopting or attempting to stage a superiority of perspective.
David’s initiation to a much more inclusive envisioning of the commu-
nity of sentient beings begins with his experience of atrocity in the human 
world—atrocity in which he is inescapably implicated both as perpetrator 
and as victim. His change of heart arises out of desperation—indeed, it 
develops on the far side of his despair. David commits both his sympa-
thetic feeling and his ethical reasoning to the plight of animals, because
he has lost all faith in the possibilities of an exclusively human kindness. 
Elizabeth Costello’s eco-ethical positions seem not, however, to have any 
such traumatic origin. At one point, Elizabeth recalls a youthful experi-
ence of sexual violence, but this abuse, although shocking, is not on a par 
with what David and his daughter are made to live through. Nor is there 
any strongly manifested link between Elizabeth’s memory of long-ago 
abuse and her eco-ethical beliefs. Her narrative development suggests 
that one does not require an extraordinarily unfortunate personal his-
tory to recognize the dearth of real humanity, real humaneness, in the 
life of modern human collectives.  e constitutive atrocity of the modern 
human experience is there to be seen; what is extraordinary, if anything, 
is our “willed ignorance” (Coetzee, Elizabeth ), our stubborn refusal to 
see it for what it is.
Although Elizabeth Costello addresses the animal topic in detail and 
explicitly promotes ecological values, it does not do so in all its chapters 
or “lessons”—a fact about the text’s overall contents which opens up the 
critical possibility of considering the animal topic as of secondary impor-
tance in the range of Coetzee’s concerns. Derek Attridge, notably, focuses 
attention elsewhere.  e “Epilogue” of his  book, J. M. Coetzee and the 
Ethics of Reading, considers the case of Elizabeth Costello.  is position-
ing, as it were in the realm of afterthoughts, makes it clear that the  
novel was not central to the conception of the critical monograph. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Attridge remains true to his argument-orienting 
understanding of literature as event, downplaying the importance of the 
The constitutive 
atrocity of the 
modern human 
experience is 
there to be seen.
 e Community of Sentient Beings | 
animal topic and placing emphasis on the lecture format: most of the 
novel’s chapters originated as public lectures; most of the chapters stage 
lecture presentations. Attridge’s argument is informative and compelling, 
but it does not seem entirely clear on just how seriously one should con-
sider the actual contents, the carefully elaborated topics, that the novel’s 
various discursive situations present. Attridge fi rst cautions against the 
readerly belief that the making of arguments is the “fundamental purpose” 
of the episodic fi ctions that house these arguments. He admits that the 
arguments “deserve to be taken seriously,” but asserts that this particular 
disposition to attentive seriousness cannot claim to catch “the full ethical 
force of the fi ctions themselves” (). However, when Attridge ventures 
statements about how one might locate this full ethical force, he is obliged 
to return again to arguments and their contents.  us, he considers that 
the crucial ethical “burden” the character Elizabeth Costello fi gures forth 
has to do with her being a novelist.  is is specifi cally “the burden of feel-
ing one’s way into other lives, including the lives of animals: the greater 
one’s capacity to enter imaginatively into a diff erent mode of existence, the 
stronger one’s horror at behavior that denies its value” (). Attridge can-
not really avoid “including” animal lives here, because it is most pertinently 
in relation to animal lives that Elizabeth Costello intensely experiences and 
describes the burden of sympathetic imagination—which is clearly a bur-
den that accords with sentient humanity and a novelist’s specifi c burden 
only by way of the fuller, more habitual awareness of the weight of it.
 e opening pages of Elizabeth Costello set up an analogical relation 
between humans and animals, an analogical relation very similar to that 
which one fi nds in the early passages of Disgrace. Elisabeth Costello’s son 
speculates, for example, on what kind of “creature” his famous-author 
mother might be: not “seal” nor “shark” but “cat,” he concludes, a large, 
undomesticated, predatory cat (). Amusingly, this large-cat author is in 
the habit of thinking of certain literature fans as “the goldfi sh” (). And 
there are other casual or casual-seeming references to the universe of 
animals.  e author’s young university-appointed guide is a “dogsbody,” 
whose conversation is marked by a couple of “mouselike pounces” upon 
the dauntingly distinguished visitor (, ).  e point here, as in Disgrace, is 
to remind us how habitual, how basic, it is for the human being to measure 
and evaluate human experience, the human condition, by means of animal 
analogies. Elizabeth Costello, however, goes an important step further 
than its predecessor by the metatextual gesture that makes the animal 
analogy a matter of explicit, focused critique. At the centre of Costello’s 
fi rst public lecture—she off ers a few during the course of the novel—is a 
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Kafka ape, Red Peter, whose appearance serves to reveal the deep prob-
lems that inhere in our habit of animal analogy.  e lecture does not put 
forward, nor even as yet imply, a well-developed ecological vision, but it 
serves signifi cantly to remind us that the human being is an animal, an 
animal that may learn to wear clothing conforming to certain conventional 
standards, to eat with instruments and chew with mouth closed, to speak 
its thoughts in more or less orderly sequence—but an animal nonetheless. 
 erefore, Kafka’s ape is justifi ed in undertaking his demonstration of 
human status: why can he not be just another animal who has adequately 
appropriated the forms of human being? Is that not what we all are, ani-
mals who learn to see ourselves, and who learn to expect that we will be 
seen, as human? But if the substructure of our community, of our sense 
of shared being, is animality rather than a supposed humanity, which we 
perhaps too facilely claim—what then? We would be obliged to review, 
with a rigorously ethical gaze, our relationship with animality, with ani-
mals.  is understanding, toward which David Lurie spends much of his 
narrative life groping, is a pre-established premise for Elizabeth Costello. 
In this respect, her vision manifests a very signifi cant change from that 
which characterizes the narration of the Magistrate’s experience in Waiting 
for the Barbarians. In this much earlier fi ction, Coetzee is still working in 
relation to a well-established ethical measure: it is atrocious for a human 
being to treat another human being like an animal. In Elizabeth Costello, 
what is atrocious is the way those who think of themselves as human treat 
those they think of as merely animals—or merely animal-like.
But, of course, Elizabeth Costello is not satisfi ed merely to refocus or 
reorient the way human beings think about human status, about animals, 
about relations between the human and the animal. Her challenge does 
not restrict itself to the manner of thinking but addresses the very fact 
of thinking, the tacit faith that we humans can think our relation with 
animality, and think it rightly, reasonably. Elizabeth Costello specifi cally 
asserts that she refuses to “bow to reason” (), to “subject [her] discourse 
to reason” (). She does not accept, as the philosophical tradition has 
done, that reason is “the being of the universe”; for her, it is “a certain 
spectrum of human thinking” (), and one that has been abusively applied 
to the delineation of the human relationship with the animal.  e denun-
ciation of this abuse is the precise point of Costello’s engagement with 
experimental intelligence-testing as applied to higher apes. Such testing, 
she argues, insensitively pursues demonstrations of instrumental reason. 
It unreasoningly ignores the fact that reason is an occasional adjunct of 
sentient being, and that it can never maintain itself autonomously, apart 
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from a state of being that is also sentient.  us, the right reason of a 
chimpanzee confronted with a bunch of bananas suspended out of reach 
and a nearby wooden crate is not the instrumental reason the human 
scientist is looking for: drag crate to position under bananas, climb on 
crate, retrieve bananas.  e right reason of a sentient being would take 
shape as an anxious questioning, such as: Why has my caregiver decided 
to torment my hunger rather than feeding me?  e ape may or may not 
reason as a sentient being—fairly much impossible to verify that—but it is 
clear, at least for Elizabeth Costello, that the human scientist has failed to 
do so. Notwithstanding the starkly drawn diff erences between the world 
views of Elizabeth and her sister Blanche (Sister Bridget), Blanche, in a later 
chapter, unwittingly echoes her sister’s condemnation of primate studies, 
publicly denouncing the human sciences, which have “enthroned … the 
monster of reason, mechanical reason” ().  e discourse of Elizabeth 
Costello thus registers an important advance beyond that which one fi nds 
in Disgrace: it is not simply the valorization and use of reason but the 
valorization and use of a reason disconnected from sentience that may 
lead to inhumanity, subtle or stark.
Early in Disgrace one fi nds an acerbic denunciation of “the great 
rationalization” () of the contemporary university, a late-modern devel-
opment which, as Derek Attridge rightly argues, needs to be understood 
as global, not merely South African. However, this great rationalization 
is never associated with the ethical questioning of relationships between 
the human and the animal. One may say rather that David Lurie’s eventual 
ethical position suggests that he has learned to feel his values more than 
to think them, and that, in this way, he has struck upon something like 
the proper reason of a sentient being. David decides that his “idea of the 
world” forbids him to allow dog corpses to be beaten with shovels “into 
a more convenient shape for processing” (). David here refuses the 
instrumental reason that sees the shovel, like the ape’s wooden crate, as a 
tool that can be used in a practical way to solve a practical problem. He is 
refusing to violate what one might call a poetics of sentient being, which 
discerns in a dog’s lifeless body the formal affi  rmation of sentience. But 
David, unlike Elizabeth Costello, never manifests any clear self-conscious-
ness about his change of mind, his change of heart. He does not look 
past the individual experiential fact to the formal truth it instantiates. He 
never therefore calls deeply into question, as Elizabeth does, “the great 
Western discourse of man versus beast, of reason versus unreason” (). 
And he very nearly falls into an ethical confusion that she carefully avoids: 
Elizabeth does not choose to be ethical about animals instead of being 
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ethical about human beings. Her guiding recognition is that one cannot 
maintain a human-or-animal either/or in the making of a viable ethics. 
“To me,” she states,
a philosopher who says that the distinction between human 
and non-human depends on whether you have a white or a 
black skin, and a philosopher who says that the distinction 
between human and non-human depends on whether or not 
you know the diff erence between a subject and a predicate, are 
more alike than they are unalike. ()
 e question is not which of these two philosophers is more wrong; the 
question, the ethical question, arises in the recognition that both are 
wrong, and that both are wrong in similar ways. In both cases, one chooses 
to see and valorize diff erence rather than commonality, community.
Elizabeth Costello’s eco-ethics also represents an advance on David 
Lurie’s in that she attempts to specify how one might come to recognize 
and know the being we share with animals. In this writing, I have been 
calling it sentient being. Costello names it more poetically: she speaks of 
what it means “to be full of being” (); she speaks of “fullness, embodied-
ness, the sensation of being” and then of the experience of “being alive 
to the world” ().  is is what the human being can share with animals, 
and, by extension, one may say that atrocity, that ultimate form of human 
failure, arises out of a failure to fi nd and maintain this fullness of being. 
Using the example of poetry, Costello suggests that the struggle toward 
human fullness of being entails “feeling [one’s] way towards a diff erent 
kind of being-in-the-world” (); “it is a matter … not of inhabiting another 
mind but of inhabiting another body” ().  e central importance of the 
body, of embodied life, is stated here at the level of theory.  is theory, 
however, is amply sustained, in Elizabeth Costello, by the insistent inscrip-
tion of bodies and bodily life in the text. Laura Wright’s assertion, “ e 
animal rights argument off ered by Costello is, at its core, about bodies” 
(), is entirely apt and accurate if one understands that animals and 
bodies cohabit in the text, that the body comes to the fore to the same 
degree that the animal does so.  e body, clearly, is the coin, the currency, 
sustaining the fi ction’s ecological economy. Fullness of being absolutely 
requires the experience of embodied life, its gratifi cations and its liabilities; 
ecologically ethical life requires the recognition that such experience is 
profoundly shared.²
In reading Elizabeth Costello, one can understand most clearly the 
fundamental importance of animality, embodied life, and ecological vision 
The question 
is not which 
of these two 
philosophers is 
more wrong; 
the question, the 
ethical question, 
arises in the 
recognition that 
both are wrong, 
and that both 
are wrong in 
similar ways.
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when this cluster of concerns fi nds enunciation in chapters that have no 
strong evident need for it. “Realism” does not seem to have any clear need 
of Red Peter to make its theoretical points—and yet Red Peter is present, 
and prominently so. One should also note the strange and disturbing 
confrontation with the mother as animal body that brings this chapter 
or “lesson” to its conclusion: as Elizabeth Costello dozes, open-mouthed, 
her adult son John half-observes, half-imagines “her gullet, pink and 
ugly, contacting as it swallows, like a python…. No, he tells himself, that 
is not where I come from, that is not it” ().  us, John’s rather fraught 
relationship with his mother fi nds its summary form as he confronts her 
as a procreative animal body and thus recognizes, unwillingly, that ani-
mality is the deepest, most substantial source of the human life she has 
accorded to him. 
“ e Novel in Africa,” which also precedes the bringing into promi-
nence and focus of ecological concerns in chapters  and , again manifests 
no real interest in animal questions until it moves toward its resolution. 
First Macquarie Island, formerly a site of mass commercial slaughter of 
penguins, presents itself in the course of Elizabeth’s voyage and recalls 
the long history of atrocious human interventions in the animal world. 
 en, while visiting the island, Elizabeth encounters an albatross.  is 
unexpected bird—Elizabeth is looking for penguins—has, like the pen-
guin, a history of suff ering violent human threats to its species existence, 
and in modern literature since Coleridge, this bird is probably the best 
known exemplum of the culpable human relationship with the animal 
kingdom. An encounter develops: two sentient beings, both female and 
both mothers, confront and examine each other across the gap of spe-
cies diff erence. Implicitly recognizing that such face-to-face, egalitarian, 
and relational terms are hardly characteristic of the history of humans 
with their animal fellows, Elizabeth situates the experience “before the 
fall” (Coetzee’s italics, ), before the fall of animate beings into distance 
and diff erence. Moreover, this new or rediscovered relational encounter 
eff ectively mediates Elizabeth’s dialogical exchange with another human 
female who comes up to view the great bird. Elizabeth, curiously but sig-
nifi cantly, does not feel such complete and immediate fellowship with the 
human newcomer, only fi nding a basis for sympathetic feeling, right at the 
end of the chapter, in that arguably animal aspect of human experience, 
  e ordering concern with ecology, it should be noted, is what is really new here. 
Brian May has asserted in relation to earlier Coetzee fi ctions, the “presence, 
primacy, and power” of bodies (); also an “ethical fascination with the body” 
(), and a sense of the body as a potential “ethical agent” ().
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carnal pleasure (which both women have had and have shared with one 
particular man, Emmanuel Egudu—though at distinct moments in their 
own personal histories).
Chapters  and , as has already been demonstrated, treat ecological 
topics explicitly and in detail. However, the book’s remaining chapters 
do not abandon the topic, though its presence becomes more muted. In 
“ e Humanities in Africa,” Blanche (Sister Bridget) aligns herself with 
certain key positions Elizabeth has earlier taken in relation to animality 
and ecology—despite radical diff erences of perspective characterizing the 
two sisters’ thought. Blanche also rejects the too exclusively human deter-
mination of value in the modern world (as exemplifi ed by the Humanities), 
rejects the modern enthronement of reason (), along with the related 
modern claim that human beings are (or can be) “masters of nature” (). 
She even goes so far, when pressed, as to propose Orpheus as the missed 
opportunity of the predominantly Apollonian Humanities—Orpheus, 
the irresistible charmer of animals; Orpheus, who is himself a kind of 
magical animal, “A chameleon. A phoenix” (). And it is noteworthy 
that this chapter concludes, as the two earliest had done, by elaborating 
upon Elizabeth’s fl eshliness.  e chapter’s fi nal mediations are upon the 
measure of beauty, both human and animal, Elizabeth once enjoyed and 
upon her coming into greater awareness of the embodied being’s universal 
susceptibility to degeneration, decline, and death.
 e susceptibilities of embodied life, of fl eshed animal being, again 
move to the foreground in “ e Problem of Evil,” which steers inexora-
bly toward its recapitulation of Lear’s terrible recognition “of what poor, 
forked, quivering creatures we all are” ().³ “Eros” emphasizes the other 
end of the spectrum of embodied experience, considering the desiring, 
pleasure-capable body as a boon, rather than simply a mortal liability, and 
pondering its potential for congress with divinity. But even here, divine 
being, godliness, reveals itself most cogently in animal forms: the experi-
ence of “a full-grown male swan jabbing webbed feet into your backside 
while he has his way, or a one-ton bull leaning his moaning weight on 
you.” Even the Virgin Mary’s traditionally chaste conjunction with God 
is reconfi gured in fl eshly, animal terms, as the experience of “the issue 
of the Holy Ghost running down her thighs” (), of “being fucked by a 
whale,” or by the more strictly Biblical “Leviathan” (). And in “At the 
Gate,” Elizabeth fi nally attests to her judges a measured belief in frogs, in 
 In Shakespeare’s tragedy, the King’s precise response to half-frozen, shivering 
Tom o’ Bedlam (Edgar in disguise) is: “Unaccommodated man is no more but 
such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art” (King Lear ..–). 
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the irrepressible life of the Dulgannon River’s tiny frogs, which she recalls 
from childhood. Earlier in this fi nal chapter, she had asserted—in accord 
with Attridge’s ordering idea—that her vocation as artist and author for-
bade her any strong commitments to belief, but she relents, when pressed, 
and it is to palpable manifestations of animal life that she turns.
 e novel concludes with a seemingly discontinuous “Postscipt”—the 
organizing presence of Elizabeth Costello is absent here. Yet the text’s 
main protagonist and proponent of ecological values is present, as it were, 
in spirit; as Lucy Graham has noted, Lady Chandos, the speaker of the 
“Postscript,” signs herself fi nally as “Elizabeth C.” Like Elizabeth Costello, 
Elizabeth Chandos resists “rationalizing language” and strives to pres-
ent truths “sited in her body” (Graham –). Animals are insistently 
present in Lady Chandos’s impassioned prose, and her letter, despite all 
its anguished confusion about the notion of likeness in human experience, 
includes a key statement that one may describe as primordially ecologi-
cal: “Each creature is key to all other creatures” ().  e letter itself, as 
a material appeal for recognition by an other, attests to a desperate yet 
enduring faith in this “key” connection.
 is argument, now reaching its conclusion, has striven to demon-
strate that the most prominent organizing concern in Coetzee’s Elizabeth 
Costello is ecology; more precisely, that this work pushes beyond the eco-
ethical initiatives of Disgrace, positing a community of sentient beings and 
understanding this community as the basis for human values, decisions, 
and actions, both ethically and politically.⁴ In speaking thus of ecology, 
the argument shifts attention away from necessarily more limited points 
of focus such as animal rights, or the value of sympathetic imagination, or 
the social value of literature. Coetzee’s ecology demands that social and 
political issues be examined within a broader fi eld of concern. It calls upon 
readers to look beyond the human, and in this action of looking beyond, 
the social and political value of Coetzee’s work becomes evident. As my 
argument notes in its early development, the category of the animal, and 
the animal analogy by which it is most commonly deployed, have a deep 
  Concerning the relationship between the ethical and the political, which it has 
not been the purpose of this paper to articulate thoroughly, Spivak is particularly 
instructive. She argues that the ethical and political considerations informing 
Coetzee’s fi ctions—and particularly Disgrace—are contingently though opposi-
tionally staged; the textual orientation is not, by turns, ethical and then political 
and then ethical again; the ethical and the political are ongoingly contingent 
and oppositional. Power and value, interest and responsibility—these concerns 
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and detailed history in the legitimating discourses of social systems of 
discrimination and subordination. Closely—indeed, contingently—allied 
to conceptual and discursive uses of the animal, moreover, is a privileg-
ing of reason among the human faculties and the establishment of biased 
systems for defi ning what rationality is (or should be), and for limiting or 
denying access to the status of rational being. Coetzee’s enunciation of 
his ecology demonstrates that such uses of the animal and of privileged 
reason are essentially, inescapably abusive (rather than only occasionally, 
circumstantially so); that such uses are not to be remeasured, limited, and 
corrected, but denounced.
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